For the first time, a collection of dissents from the mostfamous Supreme Court cases If American history can truly be traced through the majoritydecisions in landmark Supreme Court cases, then what about thedissenting opinions? In issues of race, gender, privacy, workers'rights, and more, would advances have been impeded or failuresrectified if the dissenting opinions were in fact the majorityopinions? In offering thirteen famous dissents-from Marbury v. Madison andBrown v. Board of Education to Griswold v. Connecticut and Lawrencev. Texas, each edited with the judges' eloquence preserved-renownedSupreme Court scholar Mark Tushnet reminds us that court decisionsare not pronouncements issued by the utterly objective, they are infact political statements from highly intelligent but partisanpeople. Tushnet introduces readers to the very concept of dissentin the courts and then provides useful context for each case,filling in gaps in the Court's history and providing an overview ofthe issues at

An English court in 1736 described rape as an accusation“easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defendedby the party accused, though never so innocent. ”To prove thecrime, the law required a woman to physically resist, to put up a“hue and cry,” as evidence of her unwillingness. Beginning in the1970s, however, feminist and victim-advocacy groups began changingattitudes toward rape so the crime is now seen as violent initself: the legal definition of rape now includes everything fromthe sadistic serial rapist to the eighteen-year-old who hasconsensual sex with a fourteen-year-old. This inclusiveness means there are now more rapists among us. Andmore of rape’s camp followers: the prison-makers, the communitywatchdogs, law-and-order politicians, and the real-crime/real-timeentertainment industry. Vanessa Place examines the ambiguity ofrape law by presenting cases where guilt lies, but lies uneasily,and leads into larger ethical questions of what defines guilt, whatis justice, and wh