The fact that London was parliamentarian rather than royalistwas one of the principal reasons for the defeat of Charles I in theEnglish Civil War. This book reinterprets London's role. Itexamines the relation of the municipality and of the City fathersas business magnates with both of the early Stuart kings and theirparliaments, and explores the business connections of the City withthe royal court, concluding that, far from being the natural alliesof the king and court as is generally assumed, the City elite hadmostly been seriously alienated from them by 1640. Professor Ashtonoffers an interpretation not only of the City's role in the yearsbefore 1640 but also of the reasons lying behind its support forparliament in 1642. It is both a contribution to the debate on theorigins of the Civil War and a study in depth of the connectionbetween big business and politics in early Stuart England.
'We have no choice but to go fight,' WaLty said,his voice still hoarse, his delivery slow. 'We try to piecetogether some proof. We go to court and fight Likehell, and when we Lose we can tell our clients that we foughtthe good fight. In every Lawsuit,somebody wins, somebody Loses.Sure, we'll get our butts kicked, but at this point I'drather walk out of the courtroom with my head upthan deal with sanctions and malpractice claims.'
Located at the intersection of law, political science,philosophy, and literary theory, this is a work of constitutionaltheory that explores the nature of American constitutionalinterpretation through a reconsideration of the long-standingdebate between the interpretive theories of originalism andnonoriginalism. It traces that debate to a particular set ofpremises about the nature of language, interpretation, andobjectivity, premises that raise the specter of unconstrained,unstructured constitutional interpretation that has hauntedcontemporary constitutional theory. It presents the novel argumentthat a critique of the underlying premises of originalism dissolvesnot just originalism but nonoriginalism as well, which leads to therecognition that constitutional interpretation is already andalways structured. It makes this argument in terms of the firstprinciple of the American political system: by their fidelity tothe Constitution, Americans are a textual people in that they livein and through the terms of a fun
